Shortly
after noon on Oct. 21, 1805, HMS Revenge, a newly commissioned
74-gun British battleship, moved sluggishly in light breezes and a heavy
swell. Across the horizon, 26 more ships under the command of Adm. Horatio
Nelson sailed relentlessly toward 33 Franco-Spanish ships commanded by
Adm. Pierre Villeneuve. England had spent years in a fierce and costly
war of opposition to Revolutionary France and the ambitions of Napoleon.
The two fleets would collide in an epic battle just off Cape Trafalgar
near the Spanish port of Cádiz. The stakes were high. If the Franco-Spanish
fleet won, Napoleon might finally be able to invade Britain. And if the
Royal Navy triumphed, he would lose all hope of expanding his empire.
On
board the Revenge, Lt. Lewis Hole turned the page in his logbook
and took note of the typical conditions at sea—“Light Breezes
and Clear.” Although his commander, Capt. Robert Moorsom, kept the
official log of the ship’s activities, Hole and all young officers
like him maintained logbooks as part of their training. Usually, Hole
recorded the position of the ship, the
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Logbook entry of
HMS Revenge for the day of the
Battle of Trafalgar, Oct. 21, 1805.
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weather conditions—especially the wind—and any notable activities
that occurred on board. This would be a busy day, however, and Hole had
little time for details. Nonetheless, his laconic entry—now part
of the Huntington’s rich holdings from the Napoleonic era—provides
a backdrop to the Battle of Trafalgar and the death of its hero, Lord
Nelson.
Lt. Hole had participated in the Battle of Copenhagen four years earlier,
one of Nelson’s great victories, and was now serving with Nelson
in what would be the last battle for both of them. On board the lead ship,
HMS Victory, Lord Nelson had ample time to consider the innovative
strategy that would assure an outcome worthy of his ship’s name.
In the age of sail, naval tactics called for enemy fleets to form opposing
lines before slowly approaching one another. The fleet that was upwind
had the advantage since it could pick the timing of the clash. The battle
would thus play out as a series of ship-to-ship actions. The fleet that
captured the most ships or forced the enemy to flee would earn the victory.
But unpredictable winds, fog, and currents—not to mention differences
in sailing skill—could lead to indecisive outcomes.
Nelson sought a crushing strategy. Rather than forming his vessels into
a single line for a ship-to-ship clash, he divided his fleet into two
squadrons—one that he would lead in the Victory, the other
led by Adm. Cuthbert Collingwood in the Royal Sovereign. The
two squadrons would attack perpendicular to the Franco-Spanish fleet,
thereby cutting it in two places. An attack to the middle and rear of
the enemy fleet would render the lead ships helpless since they would
be forced to reverse course in order to join the fray. The time needed
to complete such a maneuver would all but remove them as a factor in the
battle.
There were formidable risks in such a strategy. The Victory and
Royal Sovereign would be subject to a brutal cannonade
from multiple ships before they could bring their guns to bear. Nelson
trusted that the Franco-Spanish ships, many of which had been penned up
in Cádiz for some time, lacked the necessary gunnery skills to
aim accurately in the heavy swell. The Royal Navy, on the other hand,
took pride in its masterful skills after years of practice. The British
ships could thus crash through and start doubling up on the enemy ships,
confronting them from both sides.
Nelson’s
plan would work best if the Franco-Spanish fleet were in a single-line
formation. Unfortunately for Nelson, Adm. Villeneuve had steered south
after leaving Cádiz and then changed his mind and turned north
to face the British. As his fleet reversed course, the line split into
separate squadrons. Ships overlapped one another, presenting a great danger
to the British as they broke through and found themselves doubled up.
But Nelson was committed to his strategy and had confidence in his ships,
his men, and, above all, his gunnery. |
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Lt. Hole and the Revenge sailed in Collingwood’s squadron.
Since the Revenge was new and fast, Collingwood ordered it to
move up the line. As it came upon the enemy ships, Hole had time to record
Nelson’s famous signal to the fleet, which was delivered through
a series of flags flying from the Victory: “England expects
every Man will do his Duty.” Then all he and his shipmates could
do was wait as the Royal Sovereign, Collingwood’s flagship,
took a pounding at 25 minutes after noon and then pushed its way through
the line wreathed in smoke. One by one the other British ships crossed
through. As the Revenge sailed into the melee 10 minutes behind
its lead ship, it was surrounded by four 74-gun enemy ships—the
Aigle, Achille, Indomptable, and San Justo—and
the 112-gun Principe de Asturias. The Revenge drew heavy
fire, losing the ability to steer as the rudder was shot away, and suffered
79 dead and wounded while keeping up a deadly cannonade against the enemy
ships. Once free of this maelstrom, and aided by the Polyphemus
and Dreadnought, the ship sailed into quieter waters to begin
an extended period of repair. Of this hurricane of action, Hole notes
only that the Revenge found itself at 4:45 p.m. with “4
French Ships and one Three Decker on us at once.” Then Hole is silent
until he records the signal to take ships in tow at 5:30 p.m.
Nelson’s strategy had worked and English gunnery proved decisive,
but he paid for his great victory with his life. Nineteen enemy ships
were captured, one destroyed, and many others heavily damaged. What remained
of the Franco-Spanish fleet crept into Cádiz; a number of ships
were later captured while trying to leave. As was the custom, Hole took
note of the weather and his ship’s activities before beginning a
new page: “At noon Fresh Breezes… Clearing away the Wreck.”
Robert C. Ritchie
is W. M. Keck Foundation Director of Research at The Huntington.
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Maritime
History
The
Battle of Trafalgar is perhaps one of the most heavily researched
events in modern British history. Hole’s logbook is part of
the Huntington’s collection of maritime and naval history,
which spans 500 years. Holdings from the Napoleonic era include
more than 200 letters and papers by Nelson himself, collections
of the papers of admirals Richard Howe and Sir William Sidney Smith,
numerous letters from other naval officers, and the rich correspondence
of Thomas Grenville, First Lord of the Admiralty in 1806–7.
Hole’s daily record is the first ship’s log from the
era of the Napoleonic wars to enter the Library’s collection.
It represents yet another dimension of a moment that changed history.
The log of the Revenge remained in Lt. Hole’s possession after
the battle and stayed with his family until it was sold at auction
in 1983. It was then acquired by The Huntington in 2000. The log,
260 pages total, records the ship’s activities from May 8
to Dec. 25, 1805. It also includes details of Hole’s campaign
as commander of HMS Hindostan, which served off the coast of Portugal
in 1807–8, supplying Wellington’s army during the Peninsular
Campaigns. After Trafalgar, Hole would be involved in single-ship
actions but never again in a battle.
The logbook will be on display in October 2005 to commemorate the
200th anniversary of the battle. |
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